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ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
BOUNTIFUL CITY'S AND DAVIS COUNTY'S 
ACTIONS DID NOT INVOLVE THE MANAGEMENT 
OF FLOOD WATERS OR THE CONSTRUCTION, 
REPAIR AND OPERATION OF A FLOOD AND 
STORM SYSTEM. 
A. Bountiful City. 
1. Roadway. 
The main thrust of Point I in Bountiful City's brief 
is an argument that the decision to require construction of the 
access road in one phase rather than three phases is an action 
involving the management of flood waters or the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm systems. Bountiful 
City relies on the affidavits of Jack P. Balling, which state 
inter alia: 
4. One of the purposes of streets and the 
purposes of curbs, gutters, inlet boxes storm 
drain lines and storm detention basins are for 
the collection and management of storm waters. 
(Affidavit) (Respondent Bountiful City's 
Brief, p. 15.) 
This is Bountiful City's sole support for its proposition that 
the decision to require the construction of the street in one 
phase rather than three constituted a flood control decision. 
Such an interpretation is untenable. 
It is not the purpose of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 to 
grant immunity to any city activity which impacts peripherally 
on flooding. If one accepts Bountiful City's position, any 
activity of the City concerning road construction would be 
granted immunity because it would impact slightly on flood 
control. This was clearly not the intent of the legislature. 
It is obvious that the primary purpose of a road is to provide 
for the movement of vehicular traffic, not flood control. Jack 
Balling, in his deposition, states that the reason why Bountiful 
City required construction in one phase rather than three was to 
provide access to the development. The decision was not a flood 
control decision. 
Q. What was the purpose for having the road be 
completed all at one time? Why was it 
required that the road be put in connecting 
Bountiful Boulevard and Monarch Drive? 
A. That was in the ordinance. This property 
lies within the boundary of what is called 
the foothill ordinance, and in order to 
develop it, it had to have two accesses. 
(Jack Balling Depo. p. 85.) 
Jack Balling then testified that the road was 
constructed for the purpose of providing serviceability to the 
subdivision, not flood control. 
Q. Do you know what the purpose is behind 
the ordinance requiring two accesses? 
Or what is your understanding of the 
reason for that? 
A. Well, I think the understanding of the 
reason is so that, you know, you have 
accessibilities for emergency vehicles, 
fire, police, for the serviceability to 
the lots that are in the area, without 
having one way that could be obstructed 
and then there not being any access into 
that development. And we1re looking at 
a long, big development. The maximum 
length of any private dead-end street is 
600 feet under our ordinance. When you 
have an area longer than that, then it 
has to have two accesses from both ends. 
And particularly in the foothill 
ordinance. It's specified in the 
ordinance that you have to have access 
from two different locations. 
(Jack Balling Depo. pp. 88-9.) 
It is well settled Utah law that deposition testimony 
cannot be contradicted by a subsequent affidavit for purposes of 
summary judgment. Guardian State Bank v. Humpherys, 7 62 P.2d 
1084, 1087 (Utah 1988); Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 
(Utah 1983). In the instant case, Bountiful City attempts to 
use the affidavit of Jack Balling in a manner that contradicts 
his express deposition testimony. Jack Balling, in his 
deposition, states that the reason the road was required to be 
constructed in one phase was to provide access to the Bridlewood 
project. The fact that a subsequent affidavit states a 
different reason clearly illustrates that there is a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding the purpose of the requirement. 
Additionally, on page 15 of its brief, Bountiful City 
attributes to the lower court a statement which is clearly not 
included in the court's ruling. The trial judge in granting the 
motion for summary judgment never stated that it was quite 
evident that the acts complained of in plaintiffs' First Amended 
Complaint and the Amended Third-Party Complaint were in the man-
agement of flood waters or in the construction, repair and opera-
tion of flood and storm systems and involved acts or the failure 
to act to do the acts of planning, designing, constructing 
repairing and operating or managing flood waters. The alleged 
statement by the court is nowhere to be found in the record. 
It should also be noted that the requirement that the 
road be completed in a single phase was imposed prior to the 
development of a regional detention basin- In other words, even 
if one were to assume that the access road was part of a flood 
control system, the water collected from the road had nowhere to 
go. There was no destination point for the water to collect. 
It is totally illogical to argue that it was a flood control 
decision to put the road in all at once without showing that 
there was someplace for the water to go. 
2. Absolute Immunity. 
Bountiful City also argues that §6 3-30-3 grants a 
governmental entity absolute rather than qualified immunity in 
regard to the management of flood waters and the construction, 
repair and operation of flood and storm systems. Bountiful's 
argument is premised on the fact that the flood control language 
is contained in a separate paragraph. 
It is incongruous to accept Bountiful City's argument 
for a potentially limitless construction of the phrases 
"management of flood waters" and "construction, repair and 
operation of flood and storm systems" and also accept the City's 
argument that this immunity is absolute and not subject to the 
waiver provisions of the Act. If absolute immunity was 
intended, the legislature would have termed it absolute immunity 
rather than a governmental function which in the preceding 
paragraph of the same code section it defines as being subject 
to certain enumerated waivers. 
Additionally, the Governmental Immunity Act does not 
grant any activity absolute immunity. All immunity bestowed by 
the Act pursuant to classification as a governmental function is 
a qualified immunity. If the legislature had intended such a 
radical departure from existing statutory law, it would not have 
merely tacked the amendment onto the existing language contained 
in §63-30-3- Rather, the legislature would obviously have 
enacted a new and separate provision explicitly conferring 
absolute immunity on certain governmental activities and 
functions. Because the amendment is made to a pre-existing 
provision, the surviving language, terms and definitions of that 
provision clearly apply to the amendment. 
The foregoing principle of statutory construction is 
well supported by existing Utah case law. See Gleave v. Denver 
and Rio Grande Western Railroad, 749 P.2d 660, 672 (Utah App. 
1988), "[The court must] assume that each term in the statute 
was used advisedly11; Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., 
679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984), "The best evidence of the true 
intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Act is the 
plain language of the Act. The meaning of a part of an act 
should harmonize with the purpose of the whole act. Separate 
parts of an act should not be construed in isolation from the 
rest of the act"; Osuala v. Aetna Life and Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 
243 (Utah 1980), "There are some cardinal rules of statutory 
construction to be considered in relation to this controversy. 
If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or 
application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to 
analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and 
to harmonize its provision in accordance with the legislative 
intent and purpose"; Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island 
Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d 963, 964 (1966), "It is a 
cardinal rule of statutory construction that all parts of the 
enactment should be considered together so as to produce a 
harmonious whole and to give effect to the intent and purpose 
to be divined from the entire act." 
Bountiful City has taken the position that the decision 
to construct the road in one phase was a flood control decision 
because a road has a peripheral relationship to a flood/storm 
system. Bountiful City then argues that its immunity for this 
decision is absolute, not qualified. The adoption of Bountiful 
City's position would allow every City decision relating to a 
road to be shielded by absolute immunity. The fallacy of this 
interpretation is illustrated by the very existence of §63-30-8 
which waives governmental immunity for the defective condition 
of a road. Section 63-30-8 provides: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for any injury caused by a defective, 
unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, 
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, 
culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other 
structure located thereon. 
The existence of this specific waiver provision and the 
argument that a road is part of a storm system with decisions 
concerning the road being shielded by absolute immunity are 
simply incompatible. The legislature surely did not intend to 
grant an activity absolute immunity in one provision and then 
proceed to waive that immunity in a subsequent provision. To 
render these provisions compatible either decisions concerning 
road construction are not covered by the second paragraph of 
§6 3-30-3, or the immunity bestowed in the second paragraph of 
§6 3-30-3 is qualified rather than absolute. In either case, the 
trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Bountiful 
City is not supported by law and must be reversed. 
B. Davis County. 
In addressing the §63-30-3 argument, Davis County 
divides its response into two distinct areas. First, Davis 
County argues that it had no involvement in the decision to 
require the construction of an access road. Second, Davis 
County apparently admits that it delayed in getting the regional 
detention basin on line, but asserts that it is immune from 
liability pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3. 
1. Roadway. 
Davis County attempts to claim that it had no involve-
ment or control in respect to decisions involving the access 
road. Although Bountiful City may technically have had formal 
control over the road issue, it is obvious that an informal or 
tacit agreement existed between Bountiful City and Davis County 
which granted Davis County substantial control in these types of 
decisions. This conclusion is supported by ample evidence. 
For example, when the Bountiful City council granted 
preliminary approval for the Bridlewood Subdivision, the 
planning commission recommended that preliminary approval be 
granted subject to the following conditions: 
. . . (6) Developer to provide on-site storm 
detention facilities to the satisfaction of 
Bountiful City, Davis County and adjacent 
property owners . . . (Emphasis added) 
(Exhibit 90; Brief of Respondent Bountiful 
City, Statement of Fact No. 2.) 
It is thus apparent that from the inception of the Bridlewood 
Project, Davis County had a substantial, albeit possibly 
unofficial, role in relation to activities involving the 
Bridlewood Project. 
Davis County's involvement in the access road issue is 
aptly illustrated by the following deposition testimony from 
its own representative Sid Smith and the letter to which this 
testimony refers. 
Q. Let me show you what has been marked as 
Exhibit 98, and once again, I did not see 
this as part of Commissioner Tippetts' file, 
but it is a letter written by Commissioner 
Tippetts to Douglas Todd of the Planning 
Commission of Bountiful City and the letter 
is dated May 30, 1985. Can you just glance 
over that and let me know if you've ever seen 
it before? 
A. I believe the first time I saw it was at 
Mark Sandberg's deposition. I don't believe 
I saw it before then. 
Q. Did you ever have any conversation with 
Commissioner Tippetts about the contents of 
this letter? 
A. Not that I recall. Could I look at it a 
little more fully? I don't recall it and 
most likely would not have discussed it, 
because it strictly involved the roads and 
I had no involvement in the roads whatsoever 
at the time. (Emphasis added) 
Q. Based upon your experience in working with 
Davis County in capacities that you have 
worked, did you have an opinion as to why 
Commissioner Tippetts is apparently injecting 
hi elf into the design of the roadway and 
whjy lie's talking with Bountiful City about 
that? (Emphasis added) 
A- Most likely he had a concern for the unincor-
porated part of the county and the overall 
traffic flow of the area. (Emphasis added) 
(Sid Smith Depo. pp. 105-106.) 
The letter which this deposition testimony refers to 
was written by a Davis County commissioner to the Bountiful City 
planning commission. Courtesy copies were also sent to John 
Booth, Bountiful Planning Director, and Jack Balling, Bountiful 
City Engineer, as well as other officials of Davis County. The 
letter states in pertinent part: 
It has come to our attention that the Bridlewood 
Subdivision has been scheduled for some approvals 
at your June 14 Planning Commission meeting. We 
are a bit concerned in that it would appear that 
flood control and street circulation considerations 
have not been adequately addressed. . . . Both 
the road circulation and flood considerations are 
critical. 
If approvals are contemplated for this subdivision 
on June 4, may I respectfully request that they 
be held in abeyance in order for Bountiful City 
representatives, North Salt Lake City representa-
tives, and appropriate individuals from Davis 
County to have an opportunity to further evaluate 
the requirements for a properly aligned road and 
for addressing the flood control considerations. 
Your cooperation and that of the Planning 
Commission is respectfully requested. (R. 350-51; 
Exhibit 98) 
It is quite evident that Davis County did in fact exer-
cise control over decisions respecting the Bridlewood 
development or, in the very least, expected to be consulted with 
and grant approval before any major decisions concerning the 
Bridlewood project were undertaken. 
Other deposition testimony also supports the above-
stated conclusions. For example, Mark Sandberg, one of the 
developers f representatives, testified: 
Q. Who on behalf of your company studied 
erosion control after or prior to the time 
you made these cuts for the road in late 
1985? 
A. Well, I don't understand the question. 
Q. Well, let me ask the question. Did anyone, 
you or anyone from your company, study the 
impact of cutting those roads? 
A. No, but we relied on the professional ser-
vices of the Consortium. They were the 
engineers for Bridlewood; they were the 
professionals. We also relied on the pro-
fessional input of Bountiful City and to a 
lesser extent, Davis County. 
(Emphasis added) (Mark Sandberg Depo. p. 83.) 
Clark Jenkins, another representative of the developers, 
testified: 
Q. The development company agreed to make sure 
it was passed by Davis County and approved? 
What do you mean, stipulation of whom? 
A. I don't know if stipulation is the right 
word, but anyway when we were annexed, there 
was a dispute or an objection I guess from 
North Salt Lake. And one of the problems 
was storm. And so when we got it annexed, 
it was agreed that both Davis County and 
North Salt Lake would look at our plans and 
make sure it met their standards as well as 
Bountiful City. They also put a restriction 
on us that, if I remember, and this is off 
my mind, I think we were allowed--we had to 
retain water and only be able to release 
like 2 cfs, if I am not mistaken. 
(Clark Jenkins Depo. p. 101.) 
Q. Yes. In other words, Bountiful was saying 
"Until we have Davis County and North Salt 
Lake satisfied, we're not going to approve 
it"? 
A. That's right. 
(Clark Jenkins Depo. p. 102.) 
From the foregoing, it is clear that a substantial mate-
rial fact issue exists concerning the control exercised by Davis 
County over the Bridlewood project. When such a genuine issue 
of material fact exists, the granting of summary judgment is 
clearly not appropriate. Therefore, the trial court's entry of 
judgment in favor of Davis County should be reversed. 
2. Delay. 
Davis County argues that it is not liable for damage 
occasioned by its delay in getting regional detention basin on 
line, because governmental immunity applies not only to the 
exercise of a governmental function, but also to the failure or 
omission to exercise a governmental function. In support of 
this proposition, Davis County cites the case of Madsen v. 
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). In Madsen, the failure or 
omission to act which was shielded by governmental immunity 
concerned the defendants alleged failure to exercise a 
statutory duty in supervising banks. This is far different from 
the situation presented here. In this case, the evidence is not 
simply that Davis County merely failed to act. Rather, Davis 
County acted improperly in several respects such as injecting 
itself into the roadway construction issue, making promises it 
did not keep, and foreclosing developers from constructing their 
own detention basin. Madsen clearly does not apply to these 
actions. 
Additionally, Madsen is further distinguishable because 
it involved the failure of a state official to comply with an 
affirmative statutory duty. In other words, he was required by 
statute to act. "The commissioner and his department have the 
duty (under the statutory law appurtenant to this controversy) 
of supervising banks, including examining resources and 
management annually . . ." Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d at 628, 
n. 2. The instant case does not involve a mandated duty which 
must be performed by a governmental official, 
POINT II. 
EVEN IF BOUNTIFUL CITY'S AND DAVIS COUNTY'S 
ACTIVITIES ARE TERMED GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS, 
THE STATUTORY WAIVERS REMAIN APPLICABLE. 
A. Bountiful City. 
1. Pleadings Sufficient. 
Even if the court concludes that Bountiful City's and 
Davis County's activities and decisions constituted governmental 
functions, this does not end the inquiry. The Governmental 
Immunity Act specifically provides for waivers of said immunity 
in certain circumstances. In its brief, Bountiful City argues 
that appellants are foreclosed from arguing a waiver under 
§§63-30-8 and 63-30-9 because said waivers were not alleged in 
plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint and in Landforms' Amended 
Third-Party Complaint. Bountiful City's position is without 
merit for several reasons. 
First, essential facts were alleged in the pleadings. 
A reading of the Amended Third-Party Complaint makes this clear. 
Second, Bountiful City's claim ignores the fact that 
this is not a motion to dismiss and this Court is obligated to 
look beyond the face of the pleadings and decide this case based 
upon the facts with all questions and all inferences resolved in 
favor of third-party plaintiffs. 
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits and omissions show that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. If there is any doubt or 
uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the 
doubt should be resolved in favor of the opposing 
party. Thus, the court must evaluate all evi-
dence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn 
from the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the party opposing summary judgment. Frisbee v. 
K & K Constr. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984). 
Third, the Cityfs argument ignores the axiomatic 
concept of notice pleading. Every fact need not be set forth in 
the pleadings. It would be a strange pleading indeed that first 
affirmatively alleged defendant was entitled to government 
immunity and then alleged why certain waivers or other reasons 
made that very immunity inapplicable. 
Fourth, Bountifulfs argument also ignores the fact that 
the statutory waivers and all facts pertaining to this matter 
were argued and briefed pursuant to the summary judgment 
hearing. (Record pp. 234-235, 384.) Both sides argued the 
meaning of the waiver provisions in the trial court. No one at 
the trial court level argued about any so called defects in the 
pleadings. Certainly, a claim that the pleadings are 
insufficient is misplaced and cannot be argued for the first 
time on appeal. See Verret v. Deharpport, 621 P.2d 598, 603 
(Or.App. 1980), "It is well settled that a party may not raise 
the inadequacy of pleadings for the first time on appeal." 
2. Bountiful's Actions Were Not Purely Discretionary. 
Bountiful City additionally argues that §63-30-10, 
which provides for the waiver of immunity for injury caused by 
the negligent act or omission of an employee does not apply 
because the decision of whether to construct a regional 
detention basin or not and the decision of whether to have a 
road put in fully or in phases are discretionary functions. 
This Court has noted that virtually all acts require 
the exercise of some degree of discretion and that the 
"statutory exception should be thus confined to those decisions 
and acts occurring at the fbasic policy making level,' and not 
extended to those acts and decisions taking place at the 
operational level, or in other words, 'those which concern 
routine, everyday matters, not requiring evaluation of broad 
policy factors.'" Gleave v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R., 
749 P.2d 660, 669 (Utah App. 1988), quoting Frank v. State, 613 
P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 1980). 
Bountiful City cites Gleave as authority for the 
adoption of the following factors to be utilized in 
distinguishing between functions at the policy making level from 
those at the operational level. In order for an act to be 
purely discretionary, one must answer affirmatively to all of 
the following four preliminary questions. 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or 
decision necessarily involve the basic 
governmental policy, program, or objective? 
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or 
decision essential to the realization or 
accomplishment of that policy, program, or 
objective as opposed to one which would not 
change the course or direction of the 
policy program, or objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require 
the exercise of basic policy evaluation, 
judgment, and expertise on the part of the 
governmental agency involved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency involved 
possess the requisite constitutional, 
statutory, or lawful authority and duty to 
do or make the challenged act, omission, 
or decision? 
Gleave, 749 P.2d at 668, quoting Little v. Utah 
State Div. of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 
(Utah 1983) . 
Bountiful then argues that its activities at issue were 
purely discretionary because they satisfied the preceding four 
factors. This argument is fallacious because the City's actions 
did not require an affirmative answer to all of the preceding 
four questions. 
First, the challenged acts, requiring a road to be 
built in one phase rather than three phases and the foreclosing 
of the option to build an on-site detention basin, did not 
involve basic governmental policies, programs or objectives. 
Bountiful City argues that a "coherent, workable street plan is 
a policy of the city." Even if this is true, it begs the issue. 
Clearly, the requirement that the road in question be 
constructed in one phase rather than three was not a basic 
governmental policy, program or objective. Additionally, 
Bountiful argues that "A flood control system utilizing streets 
and detention basins is a governmental program and objective." 
Again, this does not satisfy the test. As evidenced by Jack 
Balling!s deposition testimony, the roadway in this case was not 
a flood control component. 
Second, one must analyze whether the decision was 
essential to the realization or accomplishment of the policy as 
opposed to one which would not change the course or direction of 
the policy. Clearly, the requirement that the road be 
constructed in one phase rather than three would not change the 
course or direction of the City's street plan policy. The 
street plan policy of the City represents a decision on where to 
locate specific streets and highways. It does not involve a 
policy as to whether a street or highway should be constructed 
in one rather than three phases. Additionally, the requirement 
that the developers tie into a non-existent regional detention 
basin, as opposed to constructing their own on-site facilities, 
was not a decision which would change the course or direction of 
the City's flood control policy. 
Third, the decision concerning the street and the 
regional detention basin was not an exercise of basic policy 
evaluation and judgment. These were unnecessary requirements 
imposed upon the developers by the City and County for no sound 
reasons. These decisions resulted in the plaintiffs' injury and 
the landowners and developers should not be held liable for 
these decisions. 
Fourth, Bountiful City argues that its actions were 
fully authorized by lawful authority. Bountiful cites statutory 
provisions illustrating that it had the authority to lay out 
streets and improve subdivisions. Even assuming this to be true, 
these sections do not give the City express authority to require 
the construction of a road in a single phase rather than three 
phases- Also, Bountiful argues that the plan of a regional 
detention basin is pursuant to a countywide flood control system 
authorized by a Davis County ordinance. Again, even if one 
assumed this to be true, it does not excuse the delay in getting 
such a system on line which was the proximate cause of the 
plaintiffs' injuries. If the developer had been allowed to con-
struct an on-site basin as it was initially led to believe it 
could, the injuries would not have resulted. 
Because Bountiful's actions do not meet all four 
requirements as set forth in Gleave, the actions are not purely 
discretionary in nature and the immunity is therefore waived 
under §63-30-10. 
3. Meaning of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10.5 (1988) 
Bountiful City also argues that §6 3-30-10.5 of the 
Governmental Immunity Act is unavailable to the developers for 
two reasons, namely, that the statute cannot be applied 
retroactively, and that the statute does not apply to suits 
sounding in tort or negligence. In so arguing, Bountiful 
completely misses the point of the landowners' and developers' 
position in respect to §63-30-10.5. 
Third-party plaintiffs in their initial brief argue 
that the legislature recognized the apparent conflict between 
§63-30-3 and Article I, §22 of the Utah Constitution, and 
specifically enacted Utah Code Ann. §6 3-30-10.5 to remedy the 
situation. Article I, §22 of the Utah Constitution states, 
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for a public use 
without just compensation." Section 63-30-10.5 states: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for the recovery of 
compensation from the governmental entity 
when the governmental entity has taken or 
damaged private property without just com-
pensation. 
The language employed in both these provisions is strikingly 
similar. Clearly, the waiver contained in Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-10.5 makes Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 inapplicable in 
circumstances which would be in conflict with Article I, §22 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
Third-party plaintiffs discussed the matter in their 
initial brief to illustrate that the only logical interpretation 
of §6 3-30-3 is that the immunity bestowed is qualified rather 
than absolute. If one concludes that absolute immunity was 
intended, it would place the statute and the constitutional 
provision hopelessly in conflict. If the immunity provision was 
termed absolute, the waiver provision could not operate to save 
the Governmental Immunity Act from constitutional attack. 
Third-party plaintiffs are not asserting that §63-30-10.5 should 
be applied retroactively. Rather the enactment of §6 3-30-10.5 
illustrates that all of the activities listed under §63-30-3 and 
classified as governmental functions are accorded qualified 
rather than absolute immunity. 
Bountiful City states that it is clear that the 
activities covered under §63-30-10.5 are meant to cover only 
those takings or damages occurring pursuant to the exercise of 
the sovereign power of eminent domain. How Bountiful City came 
to this conclusion when the statute and case law are silent on 
the point is unclear. The cases cited by Bountiful City, 
Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 
(1960), and Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 
P.2d 105 (1960), obviously do not apply to the 1987 statute. 
Additionally, the cases do not purport to apply the predecessor 
statute. Therefore, Bountiful City's argument concerning 
retroactivity is misplaced, and its reliance on 1960 cases to 
construe a 1987 statute obviously does not merit consideration. 
B. Davis County. 
Davis County does not argue any of these issues and 
apparently does not dispute third-party plaintiffs' position on 
these issues. 
POINT III. 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT IS NOT 
CONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 1, §22 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
A. Bountiful City. 
Bountiful City argues in its brief that the Utah 
Supreme Court's position is that the constitutional guarantees 
afforded by Article I Section 22 may not be realized by citizens 
of the state because the legislature has failed to enact 
enabling legislation. 
The wisdom of Bountiful!s position is highly suspect. 
The court would not purport to grant every citizen of Utah basic 
property rights and leave the same citizens powerless to enforce 
them. Clearly, such a result would be unfair and unjust. 
Bountiful not only fails to address the fundamental 
policy questions at issue with respect to Article I Section 22, 
but it also fails to discuss or distinguish the cases cited by 
third-party plaintiffs at pages 36 and 37 of their initial 
brief. These cases hold that Article I Section 22 is indeed 
self-executing. Significantly, Judge Greene, who just three 
years ago analyzed this issue, so held. Katsos v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 634 F.Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986). 
Third-party plaintiffs admit there is a split of 
authority regarding whether or not Article I Section 22 is self-
executing. However, it is submitted that the better reasoned 
cases reached a just result, namely, Article I Section 22 is 
self-executing and citizens who are promised basic property 
rights under the Constitution are entitled to avail themselves 
of their promised rights. 
B. Davis County. 
Davis County completely missed the point of third-party 
plaintiffs' argument that Utah Code Ann. §6 3-30-3 is unconstitu-
tional in light of Article I, §22 of the Utah Constitution. 
Davis County argues that 6 3-30-10.5 of the Governmental Immunity 
Act is consistent with Article I, §22 and therefore the 
Governmental Immunity Act is not in conflict with an express 
constitutional provision. 
To make such an argument, Davis County must concede 
that the immunity bestowed by §63-30-3 involving "flood damages" 
is qualified rather than absolute. If the immunity was absolute, 
§6 3-30-10.5 would not operate to save the Governmental Immunity 
Act from constitutional attack which Davis County argues occurs. 
Third-party plaintiffs agree with Davis County that the 
immunity bestowed by §63-30-3 is qualified rather than absolute. 
However, if the Court construes §6 3-30-3 as creating an absolute 
immunity, it should also declare the statute unconstitutional 
because it would then clearly be in direct conflict with 
Article I Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
POINT IV. 
THE UTAH COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT REQUIRES 
THE INCLUSION OF ALL PARTIES ON A SPECIAL 
VERDICT FORM EVEN IF THEY CANNOT BE 
FORMALLY JOINED AS PARTIES IN THE ACTION. 
A. Bountiful City. 
The Utah Comparative Fault Act requires the fault of 
all parties to an occurrence to be compared at trial in order 
for the fault of the respective parties to be accurately 
apportioned. Utah Code Ann. §§78-27-38 and 78-27-40 illustrate 
that no defendant should be held liable for any amount in excess 
of the proportion of fault actually attributable to that 
defendant. If Bountiful City and Davis County are not included 
on the special verdict form, it is obvious that the landowners 
and developers will be assessed a damage award that is in excess 
of the proportion of fault actually attributable to them. 
The Utah Supreme Court had an opportunity to consider 
the propriety of apportioning fault under the Utah Comparative 
Negligence Act to a non-party in Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 
690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984). The case involved a personal injury 
action brought by a roofer who was injured when he came into 
contact with an electrical wire. The plaintiff was employed by 
Pride Roofing Company (Pride). Pride was dismissed prior to 
trial presumably due to the exclusivity of the workmen's 
compensation remedy. In other words, Pride was immune from 
further liability. 
The case went to the jury which found Provo City 
Corporation, the owner of the electrical wire, 70% negligent. 
The jury also found Monticello Investors, the owner of the 
building, 20% negligent. The jury also assessed 10% of the 
fault to Pride, which was not a party to the action. The case 
was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court which affirmed the 
decision in all respects. In commenting upon the correctness of 
the juryfs verdict, the court stated: 
This is precisely what the jury did in this 
case. It compared the negligence of Provo, 
Monticello, and Pride and determined that 
each actor's negligence concurred to cause 
plaintiff's injury and that Pride's 10% 
negligence did not supersede Provo's 70% 
negligence as a matter of fact. Ic3. at 545. 
The fact scenario in Godesky is analogous to the 
instant case. Pride was presumably dismissed prior to trial 
due to its immunity under Workmen's Compensation. Even though 
Pride was not a party to the action, the trial court had the 
jury apportion its negligence on the special verdict form 
because Pride's activities contributed to the injury. This 
decision was confirmed on appeal by the Utah Supreme Court. In 
the instant case, assuming arguendo that Bountiful City and 
Davis County are held to be immune, the jury must still have the 
opportunity to assess the proportion of fault attributable to 
them just as the jury in the Godesky case did with Pride. 
In its brief, Bountiful City does not contest this point 
but merely asserts that the Utah Comparative Fault Act does not 
require the City to be a formal party to this lawsuit in order 
for the jury to determine the City!s comparative fault. 
Interestingly, the cases relied upon by the City are those 
included in third-party plaintiffs* brief. They all stand for 
the proposition that the jury must have the opportunity to 
consider the negligence of all parties whether or not they be 
parties to the lawsuit. Third-party plaintiffs agree with the 
reasoning employed by the cases cited in BountifulTs brief, but 
contend that both the City and County should remain as a named 
defendant in this action in order for the jury to hear all 
probative evidence and accurately assess the percentage of fault 
attributable to Davis County and Bountiful City. 
It is clear from the case law and treatises which have 
been cited by both developers, landowners and Bountiful City 
that to effectuate the principles of comparative negligence, all 
parties contributing to the occurrence must have their fault 
assessed on the special verdict form. This is true whether or 
not they could ultimately be held liable to the plaintiff in 
damages. 
More importantly, however, in determining com-
parative responsibility or comparative causation 
it is not necessary to establish that all persons 
included on the verdict form would be liable for 
some or all of the damages attributable to their 
conduct or their product. Indeed, in many 
instances, it will not be possible to establish 
liability for various reasons including immunity, 
failure to join as a party, unknown identity, 
statute of limitations, or numerous other pos-
sible causes. In determining whether not to 
include additional parties on the verdict form, 
the question is not whether a judgment would or 
could be rendered against that person, but 
whether or not his conduct or his product caused 
or contributed to the action and injuries. 
Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 726 P.2d 648, 655-
56 (Idaho 1985) . 
Even if Bountiful City and Davis County are held to be 
immune from a damage award in this case, it is clear that their 
fault must be assessed by the jury to insure that a just result 
is reached as was done in the Godesky case. The purpose of gov-
ernmental immunity is to protect a government from damage awards, 
not to shift liability to third parties. The landowners and 
developers must not be saddled with more liability than that 
which is actually attributable to them. If the governmental 
entity is immune for its conduct, then that immunity impacts 
identically on plaintiffs and defendants. It represents 
liability/damages that are uncollectible. It does not mean that 
a co-defendant, who is not a governmental entity and is 
therefore not immune, has to assume liability for the 
government's actions. This is joint and several liability. 
Joint and several liability has been abolished in Utah. 
B. Davis County. 
Davis County does not argue the comparative fault issue 
and therefore apparently acquiesces in the position of the 
landowners and developers on this point. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as all other reasons, 
specified by third-party plaintiffs in their initial brief, it 
is respectfully submitted that the trial court's summary 
judgment in favor of Bountiful City and Davis County should be 
reversed and this matter should be remanded for trial against 
all named parties, including Bountiful City and Davis County-
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